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Abstract:  We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes 
are sentient, because mechanisms for consciousness are controversial even in humans. To the 
extent that there are consensuses in that literature, they do not support Woodruff's claims.  
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The nervous systems of fishes and mammals are different in many ways. Consequently, some 
have doubted whether fishes are sentient, that is, whether they have conscious experiences. 
Woodruff (2017) argues convincingly that fishes and mammals are actually more similar than 
previously thought. However, the neurobiological mechanisms for consciousness are 
controversial even in humans. Just the fact that the fish nervous system has some features 
‘thought’ by some to be potentially relevant for consciousness in mammals should not give us 
much confidence in drawing strong conclusions about conscious experiences in fishes. There are 
also mechanisms thought to be important for consciousness, which may be missing in fishes.  
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Let’s start by addressing some processes thought to be conscious in humans and not 
discussed in Woodruff’s target article on fishes. First, working memory has been closely linked 
to consciousness in mammals. This cognitive process involves the maintenance and 
manipulation of information in the short term (Baddeley, 2003), and some experiments have 
indicated that working memory cannot operate unconsciously. Though this view has been 
challenged recently (Soto, Mäntylä, & Silvanto, 2011; Trübutschek et al., 2017), this still remains 
a mechanism potentially central to consciousness.  
Second, consciousness has been associated with the global availability of information to 
different subsystems in the brain (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, Lau, & Kouider, 2017). 
Neural counterparts of this are observed in neurophysiological recordings comparing conscious 
and unconscious visual presentations (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 2017). Do 
fishes have such a mechanism for global broadcasting conscious information to various sub-
parts of their brains? 
Third, the capacity to reflect on one’s own cognitive processes (i.e., self-monitoring or 
metacognition) has also been suggested to require the awareness of the processes being 
monitored (Dehaene et al., 2017; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). This has been studied using reports of 
self-confidence (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) and other behavioral evaluations of one’s own 
knowledge (Dehaene et al., 2017; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). Do fishes have such a capacity too?  
These key processes are discussed at length in the human literature and are absent from 
Woodruff’s paper. Experimental tasks have been successfully adapted to non-human animals to 
study working memory (Carruthers, 2013; Dudchenko, 2004), global availability 
(Panagiotaropoulos, Deco, Kapoor, & Logothetis, 2012) and metacognition (Odegaard et al., 
2017; Smith, 2009). In principle, these could also be studied in fishes, but as of now we do not 
know whether their brains can support these key computations. 
Woodruff does cover some mechanisms in fishes that are complex and sophisticated, but 
the consensus in the human literature is that such mechanisms can operate without awareness 
too. For example, isomorphic organization may well be present in early sensory cortices in both 
humans and fishes, but it is well known that neurons in these structures can be active 
unconsciously in humans (Dehaene et al., 2017). Selective attention, sometimes considered the 
gateway to consciousness, has been shown to be possible to operate unconsciously in human 
blindsight (Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 1999). The same argument applies to the gamma 
band oscillations associated with selective attention and sensory binding. Gamma oscillations 
are not thought to reflect conscious processes exclusively (Merker, 2013).  
Woodruff also presents results suggesting that the dorsomedial (DM) pallium fulfills a 
function analogous to the human amygdala in defensive behaviors; he writes that “the DM is 
part of a distributed neural system that generates the feeling of fear.” This is in contradiction 
with human studies indicating that the amygdala is not necessary for the feeling of fear 
(Anderson & Phelps, 2002; Feinstein et al., 2013). It is also in contradiction with findings 
indicating that subliminal threats can activate the amygdala without generating a conscious 
experience of fear (Lapate et al., 2016; LeDoux & Pine, 2016; Mineka & Ohman, 2002; Whalen et 
al., 2004). It is possible that processes occurring unconsciously in humans are also conducted 
without awareness in fishes, hence they cannot constitute proof of fish sentience 
Other processes discussed by Woodruff remain debated in the human literature. Such is 
the case with the role of reentrant connections or recurrent processing. Some have suggested 
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that consciousness requires higher sensory areas to interact with low-level sensory regions via 
feedback connections (Lamme, 2006), but this view remains contested (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011).  
Another debated process is trace conditioning. The presence of trace conditioning in 
fishes represents an interesting finding, as some results indicate that it might require 
consciousness in humans (Clark & Squire, 1998; Knight, Nguyen, & Bandettini, 2006). However, 
this remains controversial, as some recent works also show that the brain reactivity associated 
with trace conditioning can be observed with unconscious stimuli (Balderston, Schultz, Baillet, & 
Helmstetter, 2014) and even in comatose patients (Juan et al., 2016).  
In summary, it is still too early to determine “what it feels like to be a fish.” Fishes are 
not included in the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., 2012), but that list itself 
is by no means definitive. For scientists to gain credibility on such important matters, we need 
to distinguish between known empirical facts and mere opinion. For the relevant empirical 
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